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Mind and Body, Form and Content:
How not to do Petitio Principii Analysis'
Louise Cummmgs
Abstract: Few the oretical insights have em er ged from the extensive literature discussions of
pe titio pr incipii ar gument. In par ticular, th e pattern of petitio analysis has largely been one
of movem ent between the two sides of a di chotom y, th at of form and content. In this paper,
I trace the basis of thi s d ichotomy to a du alist conce p tion of mind and world . I argue for
the rejection of the form/conten t dichotom y on the ground that its dualist presuppositions
gellerate a reductioni st analysis of cer tain concepts which ar e central to th e analysis of
petitio argumen t. I contend, for exam ple, th at no syn tactic relation can assimil ate within its
analysis the essentially holistic nature of a notion like justification. In this regard, I
expound a form of dialectical criticism which has been frequently employed in th e
philosop hical arguments of Hilary Putnam. Here the focus of an alysis is upon the way in
which the propone nt of a position pr oceed s to explain 0 1' argue for his/h er own pa r ticula r
theses. My conclusion poin ts to th e u se of such dial ectic within fu ture analyses of petitio
pr incipi i.
In recent years, Putnam has ' exhibited a philosophical preoccupation
with issues of unintelligibility , such as they relate to traditional problems
in philosophy-reference, knowledge of other minds, etc . That there is a
'problem' of reference to which a 'solu tion' must be found is, according
to Putnam , the manifestati on of a deep metaphysical impulse within us.
T his impulse has re sulted in unintelligible questions and mistaken
inquiries in all th e major disciplines of philosophy, including inquiry into
the informal fallacies.
Putnaru' s proj ect is not one of scep ticism, but is inste ad an attempt to
recapture a historical moment in our thinking, one which is prior to the
* This pape r was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow affiliated with the
Departme nt of Philosophy at Harvard Univers ity. The au thor wishes to ackn owledge her
indebtedness to Hilary Putnaru , Harvard Un iver sity, for d iscussio n of a number of the
issues addressed in this paper. T he author is also gra teful to a referee of thi s j ournal fo r
conuneuts 0 11 an earlie r version of this pap er.
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o n s e t o f s c i e n t i s m ( t h e f o r m o f s c i e n t i s m t h a t I a m c o n c e r n e d t o e x a m i n e
i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t i s t h a t o f s c i e n t i f i c r e d u c t i o n i s m ) . T h i s h e a c h i e v e s
t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s o f d i a l e c t i c - a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s
t h a t i n f o r m o p p o s i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s w i t h a v i e w t o r e v e a l i n g t h e
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e n a t u r e o f t h o s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . I n t h i s w a y , P u t n a m i s
c o n c e r n e d t o e x a m i n e t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h e d u a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f
m i n d , a n u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y w h i c h e x t e n d s t o t h e p r o j e c t o f c a u s a l t h e o r i e s
o f r e f e r e n c e . T h i s u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f
t h e c a u s a l i s t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m ( ' r e f e r e n c e i s a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ' ) i n
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e w i d e r e x p l a n a t o r y d i s c o u r s e o f w h i c h i t i s a p a r t .
T h e u p s h o t o f e a c h d i a l e c t i c a l a n a l y s i s i s a g r e a t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n b o t h o f
w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a p r o b l e m i n p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e s h a p e a n d d e p t h o f
e a c h o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s .
I w a n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t a s i m i l a r s c i e n t i s m p e r v a d e s t h e o n g o i n g
c o n t r o v e r s i e s o f f a l l a c y t h e o r y . T h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h i s s c i e n t i s m
i n c l u d e a r e l i a n c e o n d i c h o t o m i e s ( e . g . f o r m a n d c o n t e n t ) a n d t h e
i m p o s i t i o n o f u n i n t e l l i g i b l e d e m a n d s , s u c h a s t h e f r e q u e n t l y e x p r e s s e d
c l a i m t h a t f a l l a c y i n q u i r y m u s t a c h i e v e a t h e o r y o f f a l l a c i e s . A w i d e -
r a n g i n g d i a l e c t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f f a l l a c y d e b a t e s i s a s t i m e l y a s t h a t
u r g e d b y P u t n a m i n d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n r e a l i s t s a n d a n t i - r e a l i s t s . I n d e e d , a
p r e c e d e n t f o r t h e f o r m t h a t t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n s h o u l d t a k e c a n b e f o u n d i n
P u t n a m ' s d i a l e c t i c a l c r i t i c i s m s o f c o n t r o v e r s i e s o f j u s t t h i s t y p e : ' t h e a i m
w h i c h I h a v e i n m i n d i s t o b r e a k t h e s t r a n g l e h o l d w h i c h a n u m b e r o f
d i c h o t o m i e s a p p e a r t o h a v e o n t h e t h i n k i n g o f b o t h p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d
l a y m e n ' ( P u t n a r n 1 9 8 1 , p . i x ) .
T h e i s s u e s t h a t P u t n a m h a s a d d r e s s e d i n t h i s r e g a r d a r e e x t e n s i v e
a n d y e t a d i s c u s s i o n , s u c h a s t h a t w h i c h w i l l f o l l o w , r e q u i r e s t h a t I r e s t r i c t
t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e y c a n b e d i r e c t l y e x a m i n e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , I b e g i n
w i t h a s t a t e m e n t o f a i m : a c a s e i s p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e
f o r m / c o n t e n t d i c h o t o m y i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i a r g u m e n t . I
d e s c r i b e h o w t h e b a s i s o f t h i s d i c h o t o m y l i e s i n a c e r t a i n p i c t u r e w e h a v e
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m i n d a n d w o r l d . A m o d e l f o r t h e c r i t i c i s m o f
t h i s d i c h o t o m y i s p r o v i d e d b y a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f P u t n a m ' s c h a l l e n g e t o
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the causal theorist of reference. Following Putnam, I grant the causal
theorist of reference the only type of explanation available to him on his
account (explanation in terms of physicalistic/naturalistic relations) and
then proceed to demonstrate how the causalist fails to achieve even the
semblance of an explanation of reference-the causal theorist fails to
explain how one particular model of the language becomes the relation
of reference. This case, in addition to serving as an example of the type
of argumentative strategy employed by Putnam, has as its counterpart in
fallacy discussions the reductionist analysis of notions like justification in
formal (syntactic) terms. I present a justification of the non-question-
begging status of a selected argument with a view to demonstrating the
necessarily holistic nature of this pattern of justification. I further
contend that no formalist analysis of the justification pattern of petitio
argument can assimilate within its analysis the various normative and
epistemic factors which properly constitute justification. Moreover, this
situation is not improved in any way through the introduction of extra-
formalist analysis, given the way in which such an analysis is pursued in
this context. I avoid an exposition ofunintelligibility and of the pervasive
influence of Wittgenstein on Putnam's thinking in this area. These
features, while important within any detailed examination of Putnam's
dialectical method, are of only indirect relevance to the more limited aim
of the present context.
* * *
In his Dewey Lectures, Putnam (1994a) argues:
Early modern realism's philosophy of mind was an attempt to save
some room for our everyday descriptions while fully accepting [the
idea that our everyday descriptions cannot possibly apply to the
things 'as they are in themselves']. According to this new philosophy
of mind, our 'experience' is entirely a matter taking place within the
mind (or within the brain), within, that is to say, a realm conceived of
as 'inside', a realm where there are certainly no tables and chairs or
cabbages or kings, a realm so disjoint from what came to be called the
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' e x t e r n a l ' w o r l d t h a t ( a s B e r k e l e y i n s i s t e d ) i t m a k e s n o s e n s e t o s p e a k
o f a n y e x p e r i e n c e a s r e s e m b l i n g w h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e i s ' o f .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o w e r e n o t w i l l i n g t o
f o l l o w B e r k e l e y i n t o i d e a l i s m , ' e x t e r n a l ' t h i n g s a r e t h e c a u s e s o f o u r
' i n n e r ' e x p e r i e n c e s , a n d , w h i l e t h e p e r s o n o n t h e s t r e e t i s m i s t a k e n i n
t h i n k i n g t h a t h e o r s h e ' d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e s ' t h o s e t h i n g s , s t i l l w e
' i n d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e ' t h e m , i n t h e s e n s e o f h a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e s c a u s e d
b y t h e m . M o r e o v e r , e v e n c o l o r a n d w a r m t h a n d t h e o t h e r ' s e c o n d a r y
q u a l i t i e s ' ( a s t h e y c a m e t o b e c a l l e d ) c a n b e g r a n t e d a d e r i v a t i v e s o r t
o f r e a l i t y - t h e y d o n o t e x i s t a s ' i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s ' o f t h e t h i n g s ' i n
t h e m s e l v e s ' , b u t t h e y e x i s t a s ' r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s ' , a s d i s p o s i t i o n s t o
a f f e c t o u r m i n d s ( o r b r a i n s ) i n c e r t a i n w a y s ( p p . 4 6 8 - 6 9 ) .
I n t h e a b o v e p a s s a g e P u t n a m d e s c r i b e s a t y p e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' s o l u t i o n '
t o t h e ' p r o b l e m ' o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e s
t o t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d . I A l t h o u g h s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n o r i g i n , t h i s s a m e
' s o l u t i o n ' e f f e c t i v e l y e x h a u s t s t h e t y p e o f e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i s t r a d e d
w i t h i n p r e s e n t - d a y p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c o u n t s o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . F o r w h i l e i t i s
g e n e r a l l y h e l d t h a t w e c a n e x p l a i n o u r p e r c e p t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e
w o r l d u s i n g s o m e s u i t a b l y f o r m u l a t e d c a u s a l m e c h a n i s m , a s i m i l a r
m e c h a n i s m i s p r e s u m e d t o o p e r a t e w i t h i n o u r t a l k o f t h o u g h t s r e f e r r i n g
t o f e a t u r e s o f r e a l i t y . " M o r e o v e r , a s p a r t o f t h e s e a c c o u n t s i t i s a r g u e d
t h a t t h e s e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s ( 1 ) b r i d g e t h e g u l f b r o u g h t a b o u t b y t h e
d u a l i s t ' s d i c h o t o m y o f t h e m e n t a l a n d t h e p h y s i c a l ( a g u l f o v e r w h i c h o u r
c o n c e p t u a l p o w e r s c a n n o t e x t e n d ) a n d ( 2 ) s e c u r e a t y p e o f o b j e c t i v i t y , i n
t h a t b o t h p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e r e f e r e n t i a l c a p a c i t y o f l a n g u a g e
I I I I p r o p o s i n g a r e t u r n t o a n A r i s t o t e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m i n d a n d i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o
t h e w o r l d , N u s s b a u m a n d P u t n a r n , i n ' C h a n g i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s M i n d ' ( W o r d < a n d L i f e ) , r e j e c t
t h e v i e w t h a t t h e r e i s a n y ' p r o b l e m ' t o w h i c h w e m u s t f i n d a ' s o l u t i o n ' : ' A s A r i s t o t e l i a n s w e
d o n o t d i s c o v e r s o m e t h i n g b e h i n d s o m e t h i n g e l s e , a h i d d e n r e a l i t y b e h i n d t h e c o m p l e x
u n i t y t h a t w e s e e a n d a r e . W e f i n d w h a t w e a r e i n t h e a p p e a r a n c e s . A n d A r i s t o t l e l e l l s u s
t h a t i f w e a t t e n d p r o p e r l y l o t h e a p p e a r a n c e s t h e d u a l i s t ' s q u e s t i o n s n e v e r e v e n g e t g o i n g '
( I Y !J 1 b , p . 5 5 ) .
2 P u t n a r n e x a m i n e s t h e p r o p o s a l s o f a n u m b e r o f c a u s a l t h e o r i s t s i n r e l a t i o n t o r e f e r e n c e i l l
' R e a l i s m w i t h o u t A b s o l u t e s ' i l l W o r d < a n d L i fe .
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are not the products of some fanciful creation on our part, but are
ultimately 'caused' by an ex ternal world. Indeed, it is by virtue of these
causal relation s that we can assign content to our thoughts and
perceptual exper iences-outside of these relations, thoughts and
expe riences are taken to exhibit syn tactic structure only .
I want to examine thi s syntactic interface of perception and
conception , with a view to understanding the type of criticism that will be
develop ed against the form/content dich otomy. Putnarn describes th e
varied nature of th ese int erfaces as follows:
In the tradition , these 'in terfaces' . . . were originally th ought of as
mental .. . It is not, however, essential to an interface conception of
either perception or conception that the interface be mental-in
materialist ver sions, the interface can be a brain process or brain
state. In Quine's version of the interface conception of perception, it
is nerve endings on the surface of my body that play th e role of the
interface. In th e case of conception, the interface has recently been
conc eived of as con sisting of 'marks and noi ses' (Rorry ): although th e
interface is not literally 'ins ide' us on this Rortian conception, it turns
out to generat e the same problematic 'ga p' between though t and th e
world. (T here is also a version-c-Fodor's-i-in which the interface is
sentences, but not sen tences in a public language-marks and
noises-but in a language 'inside' our brains, 'men talese'. This is a
kind of combination of the linguistic conception of the interface with
the conception of the interface as 'inside the head'.) (Unpublished
lecture notes).
No twiths tanding differences in detail, each of these interfaces generates
'the same problematic "gap" between th ought and the world'. Putnam,
following John McDowell, describes reductumism and eliminativ ism3 (th e
:3 A diff erent tendency is exemplified hy the elimin ativist views of thinkers like Richard
Rorty , Pall] and Parricia Churchland , Stephen Stich and, to some degree, W. V. Quine.
Rorty, like Putnarn , re jects the centra ) tenet of metaphysical reali sm , that our mental
represe ntations are in correspo nde nce with a min d-independent reality. However, the
7 8
L o u i s e C u m m m g s
t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t t r e n d s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d ) a s a t t e m p t s t o
b r i d g e j u s t s u c h a ' g a p ' b e t w e e n t h e d u a l i s t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l
a n d t h e p h y s i c a l . P r o p o n e n t s o f t h e f o r m e r t y p e o f r e d u c t i o n i s t a n a l y s i s
t y p i c a l l y e x p l a i n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y u s i n g a r a n g e o f s c i e n t i f i c l a n g u a g e s i n
a d d i t i o n t o t h a t o f p h y s i c s : ' R e d u c t i o n i s m , w i t h r e s p e c t t o a c l a s s o f
a s s e r t i o n s ( e . g . a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t m e n t a l e v e n t s ) i s t h e v i e w t h a t a s s e r t i o n s
i n t h a t c l a s s a r e " m a d e t r u e " b y f a c t s w h i c h a r e o u t s i d e o f t h a t c l a s s '
( P u t n a m 1 9 8 1 , P : 5 6 ) . A n e x a m p l e f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s r e g a r d i s
o n e i n w h i c h t h o u g h t s a r e ' m a d e t r u e ' ( g i v e n c o n t e n t ) b y p h y s i c a l f a c t s .
' F o r a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , t h e v i e w o f B i s h o p B e r k e l e y t h a t a l l t h e r e " r e a l l y
i s " i s m i n d s a n d t h e i r s e n s a t i o n s i s r e d u c t i o n i s t , f o r i t h o l d s t h a t s e n t e n c e s
a b o u t t a b l e s a n d c h a i r s a n d o t h e r o r d i n a r y " m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s " a r e a c t u a l l y
m a d e t r u e b y f a c t s a b o u t s e n s a t i o n s ' ( 1 9 8 1 , p . 5 6 ) . A t h i r d f o r m o f
r e d u c t i o n i s t a n a l y s i s , t h i s t i m e r e l a t i n g n o t t o t r u t h b u t t o r a t i o n a l i t y , i s
t h a t o f c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s m : ' . . . t h e c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s t ' s p a r a d i g m i s a s of t
s c i e n c e : a n t h r o p o l o g y , o r l i n g u i s t i c s , o r p s y c h o l o g y , o r h i s t o r y , a s t h e
c a s e m a y b e . T h a t r e a s o n i s w h a t e v e r t h e n o r m s o f t h e l o c a l c u l t u r e
d e t e r m i n e i t t o b e i s a r e d u c t i o n i s t v i e w i n s p i r e d b y t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s ,
i n c l u d i n g h i s t o r y ' ( P u t n a m 1 9 8 3 , p . 2 3 5 ) .
I w a n t t o a r g u e , a s i n d e e d P u t n a m h a s a r g u e d , t h a t t h e c o m m o n
s t r a t e g y o f t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s i s o n e w h i c h i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e i n n a t u r e . I n
s p e c i f i c t e r m s , m y c l a i m i s t h a t n o c o h e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e ' f a c t s o f
l a n g u a g e ' - f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t w e o f t e n a s s e r t ' T h e r e i s a c a s t l e i n v i e w '
j u s t w h e n t h e r e i s a c a s t l e i n v i e w a n d n o t w h e n a n i g l o o i s i n v i e w - e a n
p r o c e e d i n t h e e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l m a n n e r t y p i c a l o f t h e a n a l y s e s
d e s c r i b e d a b o v e . I n t h i s w a y , c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n b y
f a i l u r e o f m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m h o l d s a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e s e t w o
w r i t e r s . P u t n a r n ' s r e s p o l l s e i s t o q u e s t i o n t h e d u a l i s m b e h i n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t
p i c t u r e , w h e r e a s f o r ' R o r t y t h e v e r y n o t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d : ' . . . h i s
[ R o r t y ' s ] e n t i r e a t t a c k o n t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y i s m o u n t e d o n t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f
r e a s o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a r e n a i l - p r o b l e m s , b e c a u s e t h e o n l y k i n d o f t r u t h i t m a k e s s e n s e
t o s e e k i s t o c o n v i n c e o n e ' s c u l t u r a l p e e r s ' ( P u t n a m 1 9 8 3 , p . 2 3 5 ) . I n f a c t , R o r t y h a s m o v e d
f r o m a r e l a t i v i s t t o a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n .
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Putnarn of one consequence of the decision to describe reference in
terms of non-intentional relations:
... there are infinitely many admissible models of our language, i.e.,
infinitely many models which satisfy all operational and theoretical
constraints. If the entities that these models consist of are thought of
as mind-independent discourse-independent entities, then the claim
that just one of these models is the unique 'intended' model becomes
utterly mysterious. Each of these models corresponds to a reference
relation. So there are infinitely many admissible reference relations,
RI, R2, R3, ... Someone who believes that just one of these, say RI?,
r-eally is the unique real reference relation, the reference relation,
believes that the word 'reference' is attached to RI? (and not to RI, R2,
... ) with metaphssica!glu.e. (1983, p. 295)
In the above passage, Putnam is describing a 'permutation' argument
similar to that first discussed by Quine in Word and Object. The outcome
of Putnam's version of this argument is that each sentence in the
language can be reinterpreted in such a way that while the truth-values of
whole sentences remain unchanged, the reference relations of their
component terms have been extensively altered, to the degree where
'castle' can refer to motorway in one interpretation of the language, to
hospital in a second interpretation, to the planet Saturn in a third
interpretation, ete. Quine's response to this indeterminacy in our own
language is to 'choose as our manual of translation the identity
transformation, thus taking the whole language at face value' and he has
it in mind that 'Reference is then explicated in disquotational paradigms
analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm' (1990, p. 52). A different response
to this indeterminacy is given by Michael Devitt (1984). For Devitt, the
true relation of reference is itself a causal connection which, for the
purposes of the present analysis, is exemplified by the relation RI? above.
A more recent account, that of Jerry Fodor (1990), appeals to
counterfactuals to explain reference. Fodor's counterfactuals express an
asymmetrical dependence between causal statements. In this way, the
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r e f e r e n t o f ' c a t ' i s a r r i v e d a t t h r o u g h a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l o f t h e f o r m ' I f c a t s
d i d n ' t c a u s e " c a t " t o k e n i n g s , t h e n . . . ( c a t p i c t u r e s , c a t s t a t u e s , t h e s o u n d
" m e o w " , a n d s o o n ) w o u l d n ' t c a u s e " c a t " t o k e n i n g s e i t h e r ' ( P u t n a m 1 9 9 2 ,
p . 3 8 ) .
W h e n D e v i t t d i s c u s s e s c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i t i s w i t h a n e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e i n
m i n d :
S o h i s [ t h e r e a l i s t ' s ] a n s w e r m a y i n c l u d e a s e n t e n c e r o u g h l y l i k e
T e r m x i s c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d i n w a y A t o o b j e c t y a n d t o n o t h i n g e l s e
a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n o t h e r s e n t e n c e
x r e f e r s t o y a n d t o n o t h i n g e l s e .
I n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e w i l l r e g a r d t h e r e f e r e n c e o f x a s
d e t e r m i n a t e . ( 1 9 8 4 , p . 1 8 9 )
A g a i n :
W e c o u l d h a v e f o r e t o l d t h a t w e w o u l d b e a b l e t o f i n d s o m e c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e e n t i t i e s , b e c a u s e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s a r e u b i q u i t o u s .
W e n e e d t o s e e t h e o n e w e h a v e p i c k e d o u t a s e x p l a n a t o r i l y s p e c i a l .
( 1 9 8 4 , p . 8 7 )
H o w e v e r , t h e c a u s a l t h e o r i s t l a c k s t h e o p t i o n o f s e l e c t i n g a c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n w h i c h i s ' e x p l a n a t o r i l y s p e c i a l ' . T o s e e t h i s , w e n e e d t o c o n s i d e r
e x a c t l y w h a t r a n g e o f n o t i o n s i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n o f a n
' e x p l a n a t o r i l y s p e c i a l ' c a u s a l r e l a t i o n . C l e a r l y , s u c h a s e l e c t i o n
p r e s u p p o s e s n o t i o n s o f a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s , n o t i o n s w h i c h a r e n o r m a t i v e i n
n a t u r e - a f t e r a l l , t h e r e l a t i o n w h i c h i s e x p l a n a t o r i l y s p e c i a l i s a l s o t h e
m o s t a p t ) r o p r i a t e c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e . M o r e o v e r ,
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s e x i s t s a s p a r t o f a l a r g e r w e b o f n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c
n o t i o n s . A c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e w h e n i t s a t i s f i e s t h e e x p l a n a t o r y
f u n c t i o n i t i s c a l l e d u p o n t o s e r v e . S a t i s f a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s n o t i o n s o f
a d R q u a cy , n o t i o n s w h i c h m u s t b e i n p l a c e i n o r d e r t o a s s e s s w h e t h e r a
p a r t i c u l a r p u r / J o s e , t h a t o f e x p l a n a t i o n , h a s b e e n f u l f i l l e d .
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Now, it is just these normative and epistemic considerations which are
unavailable to the cau sal theorist. He is pursuing a reductionist
ana lysis- an account of the intentional from within the non-intentional-
an essen tial feature of which is its rejection of all things normative.
Putnaru's criticism thus turns on the causal theorist's failure to provide
any intelligible explanation of reference. The decisive point in his
cha llenge to the causalist comes when he applies the causal theorist's
claim s to a sta tem en t of the causal theorist 's own position. For as Putnam
contends, if reference is (exp lained by) a causal relation, then at the very
least a causal rel ati on should be able to account for the referential nature
of that fact. However, we have just seen the Utopian nature of such a
demand-no causal relation th at is acceptable to the causalist can assume
the essen tially holistic character of the notion of explanation. Yet caus al
theories must achieve exactly this much if they are to continue in their
role as an explanation of reference. It emerges that the only option
available to the causalist is to dogmatically assert that one particular
model of th e language-say Rl~just is th e relation of reference. In
doing so, however, we have not explained why RI7 is the relation of
reference so mu ch as we have simply stated that such is the case (Putnam
1983).
It is worth examining further Putnam's challenge to the causal
theorist. I described above how a decisive point in Putnam's criticism of
the causalist was reached when the causalist was required to explain how
the statement 'r eference is a cau sal relation' referred. This point was
described as decisive because it signalled a self-refutation from which the
causalist had no route of escape-unless, of course, he was prepared to
abandon certain cen tral features of his account, such as the claim th at
causa l relation is an explana tion of reference. The form of this self-
refutati on is that in order to explain the reference of the claim 'reference
is a causal rel ati on', the causa list must appeal to a notion of reference
wider than that of causal relation. In this way, reference cannot be a
causa l relation . Hen ce, it is false that reference is a causal relation.
8 2
L o u i s e C u m m i n g s
S e l f - r e f u t a t i o n a r g u m e n t s o f j u s t t h i s t y p e f o r m a p r o m i n e n t p a r t o f
P u t n a m ' s d i a l e c t i c a l s t r a t e g y . A t y p e o f a c t i v i t y , t h a t o f e x p l a n a t i o n , h a s
b e e n c e n t r a l t o t h e s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n a r g u m e n t o f t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . I n f a c t ,
i n e a c h s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n a r g u m e n t e m p l o y e d b y P u t n a m a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m
i s u n d e r m i n e d b y a p r o p o n e n t e x p l a i n i n g o r j u s t i f y i n g i t ( s e e b e l o w ) o r
e v e n s i m p l y s a y i n g o r t h i n k i n g i t . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e s e s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n
a r g u m e n t s s t e m s f r o m w h a t t h e y a r e a b l e t o t e l l u s a b o u t n o t i o n s s u c h a s
r e f e r e n c e . I t w a s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e h o w c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s f a i l e d a s a n
e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e , a f a i l u r e w h i c h w a s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e n o n -
i n t e n t i o n a l n a t u r e o f t h o s e r e l a t i o n s . I n o w w a n t t o m a k e t h e s t r o n g e r
c l a i m t h a t e v e r y a t t e m p t t o a c c o u n t f o r r e f e r e n c e i n t h i s n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l
w a y i s d o o m e d t o f a i l u r e , g i v e n t h a t r e f e r e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s i n t e n t i o n a l i t y .
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n t u r n s o n a p a r t i c u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e ' u s e ' ,
o n e w h i c h P u t n a m a t t r i b u t e s t o t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , i n w h i c h t o
d e s c r i b e t h e w o r d s i n a l a n g u a g e g a m e ( t h i n k o f r e f e r e n c e a s b e l o n g i n g
t o j u s t s u c h a l a n g u a g e g a m e ) r e q u i r e s t h a t w e e m p l o y t h e w o r d s w i t h i n
t h a t s a m e g a m e : ' I f o n e w a n t s t o t a l k o f t h e u s e o f t h e s e n t e n c e " T h e r e i s
a c o f f e e t a b l e i n f r o n t o f m e " , o n e h a s t o t a l k a b o u t s e e i n g a n d f e e l i n g
c o f f e e t a b l e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s . I n s h o r t , o n e h a s t o m e n t i o n p e r c e iv i n g
c o f f e e t a b l e s ' ( P u t n a m 1 9 9 4 b , p . 2 8 3 ) . I n t h e s a m e w a y , t o p r o c e e d t o
d i s c u s s h o w t h e s e n t e n c e s o f o u r l a n g u a g e c a n b e a b o u t a n y t h i n g i s t o
a l r e a d y h a v e a m a s t e r y o f a v a s t r a n g e o f n o t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e n o t i o n o f
r e f e r e n c e . B e f o r e l e a v i n g t h e s e i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s t o e x a m i n e h o w t h e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a d d u c e d w i t h i n t h e m r e l a t e t o t h e m a i n t h e m e o f t h i s
d i s c u s s i o n , t h e f o r m / c o n t e n t d i c h o t o m y i n p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i a n a l y s i s , I
e x a m i n e a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e v i e w t h a t I a m p r o p o s i n g .
C e n t r a l t o P u t n a r n ' s c r i t i c i s m o f c a u s a l t h e o r i e s o f r e f e r e n c e i s h i s
c l a i m t h a t a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n f a i l s t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t h e
c a u s a l i s t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m , t h a t r e f e r e n c e i s e x p l a i n e d b y a c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n . I t m a y r e a s o n a b l y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t P u t n a m ' s c r i t i c i s m o f c a u s a l
t h e o r i e s o f r e f e r e n c e a n d m y c r i t i c i s m , t o f o l l o w , o f a f o r m a l a p p r o a c h t o
t h e s t u d y o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i - I w i l l a r g u e s u b s e q u e n t l y t h a t n o f o r m a l
( s y n t a c t i c ) r e l a t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n c a n j u s t i f y t h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t ' s c l a i m
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that the justification relation of petitio principii is a formal (syntactic)
relation-conflate what are, in effect, two quite different notions of
reference and of justification respectively. In this way, it may be argued
that by intending that a causal relation of reference serve as an
explanation of th e reference of the causalist 's theoretical claim, Putnam
is engaging in a level confusion between the reference of terms within the
causalist's theory an d the reference of the causalist's theory itself.
(Similarly, it may be argued that in the analysis of petitio principii to
follow, I am en gaging in a level con fusion, this time a confusion between
justification within an argument and justification of a particular view-a
formalist view-of the justification relation of an argument (in the case to
follow, of petitio argum en t.) It may also be argued that the satisfaction of
the former type of reference and ofjustification-the reference of terms
and the justificati on relation within an argument-is not conditional on
the prior satisfaction of the latter type of reference and of justification
respectively-the reference of th e causal theory itself and the justification
of a particular view of the justification relation of argument. Such an
objection is consis tent with Van Cleve 's views both of reference and of
epis temic justificati on. In rel ation to reference, Van Clev e subscribes to
seman tic supervenience, 'the thesis that sem an tic fact s supervene on
nonsemantic facts' (1992, p . 344). These nonsemantic facts, Van Cleve
argues , while they give rise to reference, are not themselves subject to
any demand concerning their own reference. So it is that Van Cleve,
while he himself holds 'no brief for the caus al theory' (p . 349), is quick to
cha llenge Putnam 's rejection of the view of Hartry Field, a rejection to
the effect that a naturalistic (possibly a cau sal) relation cannot be, as
Field claim s it is, th e relation of reference, on the grounds that a
naturalistic (causal) relation can be shown not to determinately refer:
If sem an tic phenomena .. . are supervenient on natural phenomena,
then there mu st be at least one true principle satisfying Field's
schema-a causal principle, as it might be , but ifnot th at, som e other
principle specifying the natural basis for reference.
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L e t u s s u p p o s e , t h e n , t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g i s a t r u e g e n e r a t i o n
p r i n c i p l e i n s e m a n t i c s . . . : i f x b e a r s R t o y , t h e n x r e f e r s t o y . N o t h i n g
m o r e i s n e c e s s a r y ; . . . C o n t r a r y t o w h a t P u t n a m r e p e a t e d l y i n s i s t s
u p o n , w e d o n o t h a v e t o b e a b l e t o ' s i n g l e o u t ' o n e r e l a t i o n a s t h e
i n t e n d e d r e f e r e n t o f ' R ' b e f o r e t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y ( o r t h e R - t h e o r y ) c a n
d o i t s j o b . W e c a n d o t h e s i n g l i n g o u t l a t e r . . . b u t w e n e e d n o t d o i t a s
a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e s u c c e s s f u l w o r k i n g o f t h e t h e o r y . O n e m i g h t p u t
t h e p o i n t t h i s w a y : a s k n o w l e d g e m a k e r s n e e d n o t b e k n o w n , s o
r e f e r e n c e m a k e r s n e e d n o t b e r e f e r r e d t o ( V a n C l e v e 1 9 9 2 , p . 3 5 1 ) .
V a n C l e v e v i e w s a s u n n e c e s s a r y P u t n a m ' s d e m a n d f o r r e f e r e n c e i n t h e
c a s e o f R i t s e l f . A s i m i l a r c l a i m c h a r a c t e r i s e s V a n C l e v e ' s a c c o u n t o f
e p i s t e m i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n - a s k n o w l e d g e m a k e r s , ' e p i s t e m i c p r i n c i p l e s n e e d
n o t b e k n o w n i n o r d e r f o r k n o w l e d g e t o a r i s e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m '
( 1 9 7 9 , p . 7 9 ) . T h e q u e s t i o n n o w i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c r i t i c i s m o f c a u s a l
a c c o u n t s o f r e f e r e n c e p u r s u e d b y P u t n a m a n d t h e c r i t i c i s m o f a f o r m a l
a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i t h a t I w i l l s u b s e q u e n t l y p u r s u e
c a n e v a d e a c r i t i c a l r e s p o n s e o f t h e t y p e a d v a n c e d b y V a n C l e v e .
V a n C l e v e c i t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i t i c i s m s b y P u t n a m o f t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y
o f r e f e r e n c e ( ' M M S ' a n d ' R T H ' s t a n d f o r , r e s p e c t i v e l y , M e a n i n g a n d t h e
M o r a l S c i e n c es a n d R e a s o n , T r u t h a n d H i s t o r y ) :
A c a u s a l t h e o r y o f r e f e r e n c e w o u l d n o t h e l p , ' f o r h o w " c a u s e s " c a n
u n i q u e l y r e f e r i s a s m u c h o f a p u z z l e a s h o w " c a t " c a n , o n t h e
m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t p i c t u r e ' ( M M S , p . 1 2 6 ) ; ' t h e r e f e r e n c e o f " x b e a r s
R t o y " i s i t s e l f i n d e t e r m i n a t e ' ( R T H , P : 4 5 ) ; ' i t i s a p u z z l e h o w w e
c o u l d l e a r n t o e x p r e s s w h a t F i e l d w a n t s u s t o s a y ' ( R T H , p . 4 6 ) . ( V a n
C l e v e 1 9 9 2 , p . 3 4 9 )
T h e s e c r i t i c i s m s , V a n C l e v e c l a i m s , c o n s t i t u t e a " j u s t m o r e t h e o r y "
o b j e c t i o n ' ( p . 3 4 9 ) o n t h e p a r t o f P u t n a m . I w a n t t o a r g u e t h a t P u t n a m ' s
c r i t i c i s m o f c a u s a l t h e o r i e s o f r e f e r e n c e i s m o r e s u b t l e t h a n V a n C l e v e ' s
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f P u t n a r n ' s c r i t i c i s m s u g g e s t s . I t w i l l b e r e c a l l e d t h a t
w h e n D e v i t t a d v a n c e s h i s c a u s a l t h e o r y o f r e f e r e n c e , h e d o e s s o i n t h e
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t s u c h a t h e o r y w i l l s e r v e a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e .
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Now, Devitt's view is not unique in this regard. For it is the case that
explanation is a central notion in all causalist accounts of reference. To
understand why this is so, one need only consider the fact that causal
theorists pursue an account of reference from within the perspective of
metaphysical realism. From within this perspective, causal theorists, as a
subgroup of metaphysical realists more generally, set about the
establishment of the following chain of explanation. Their aim is to
explain the success of science in terms of the reference of the theories of
science to subsets of the totality of all objects. Their reductionism,
particularly their predilection for physicalistic description, leads them in
turn to pursue an explanation of reference in terms of a causal relation.
When Putnam criticises this causal relation, it is for the reason that it fails
to perform any intelligible explanatory role in relation to reference. In the
first instance, the focus of Putnam's criticism is an aspect of the causalist's
rational practice, that of explanation, and not an aspect of his theoretical
account, as Van Cleve is suggesting is the case. It is this practice which
subsequently renders the causalist's theoretical claim, that reference is
explained by a causal relation, unintelligible. An understanding of how
this is achieved takes us to the very core of Putnam's dialectical criticism
of causal theories of reference.
I described earlier something of the holistic character of the notion of
explanation-various normative and epistemic concepts were shown to
be inextricably connected to this notion. I now want to argue that these
concepts constitute a precondition on the very possibility of explanation, in
much the same way that the laws of logic for Kant are constitutive of the
possibility of thought. Where these prior concepts are absent, what
emerges is not a different kind of explanation, but rather no explanation
at all. Connected to the impossibility of explanation in the absence of prior
normative and epistemic concepts is the unintelligibility of explanation in
the absence of these concepts-prior normative and epistemic concepts
confer sense on the notion of explanation. Now, the proponent of a causal
explanatory relation of reference-this is, in effect, what the causal
theorist is proposing through his claim that a causal relation explains
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r e f e r e n c e - f i n d s h i m s e l f i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f d e n y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r i o r
n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t s i n h i s a c c o u n t o f r e f e r e n c e - n o c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n c a n a s s i m i l a t e t h e s e n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t s w i t h i n i t s
a n a l y s i s . H o w e v e r , i n s o d e n y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e p r i o r c o n c e p t s ,
t h e c a u s a l i s t i s e f f e c t i v e l y d e n y i n g b o t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y a n d t h e
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t e r m s w i t h i n t h e
c a u s a l i s t ' s t h e o r y a n d o f a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t h e c a u s a l i s t ' s
t h e o r y i t s e l f . O f c o u r s e , t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h i s l a t t e r t y p e o f
e x p l a n a t i o n - e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y i t s e l f -
m i g h t w e l l b e t a k e n t o i n d i c a t e t h a t w h i l e a c a u s a l t h e o r y c a n g i v e r i s e t o
r e f e r e n c e , t h i s t h e o r y c a n n o t i t s e l f b e s u b j e c t t o a n y d e m a n d c o n c e r n i n g
i t s o w n r e f e r e n c e . ( V a n C l e v e ' s c l a i m , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d , i s t h a t w h i l e a
c a u s a l t h e o r y ( o r a n e p i s t e m i c p r i n c i p l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) n e e d n o t r e f e r
( n e e d n o t b e k n o w n ) , j u s t s u c h a t h e o r y c a n r e f e r O u s t s u c h a n e p i s t e m i c
p r i n c i p l e c a n b e k n o w n ) . ) S u c h a r e s p o n s e , h o w e v e r , s t i l l a s s u m e s t h a t
t h e r e i s a c a u s a l t h e o r y , a c a u s a l t h e o r y t h e r e f e r e n c e o f w h i c h c a n n o t b e
e x p l a i n e d . H o w e v e r , o n t h e v i e w t h a t I a m p r o p o s i n g , i f a n e x p l a n a t i o n
o f t h e r e f e r e n c e o f c a u s a l t h e o r i e s i s n o t p o s s i b l e , t h e n c a u s a l t h e o r i e s
t h e m s e l v e s a r e n o t p o s s i b l e - t h e c o n c e p t s w h i c h m a k e t h e s e t h e o r i e s
p o s s i b l e , t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t s w h i c h a r e i n t e g r a l t o t h e
n o t i o n o f e x p l a n a t i o n , a r e a b s e n t i n t h e c a s e w h e r e a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e
r e f e r e n c e o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s i s n o t p o s s i b l e ( o w i n g , o f c o u r s e , t o t h e c a u s a l
f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n i s p u r s u e d ) .
I t t h u s e m e r g e s t h a t t h e c h a r g e o f l e v e l c o n f u s i o n a g a i n s t P u t n a m ,
a n d a g a i n s t m y a c c o u n t o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i t o f o l l o w , f i n d s n o t a r g e t .
W h a t i n i t i a l l y a p p e a r s t o b e a p o i n t a b o u t t w o d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f
r e f e r e n c e - t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t e r m s w h i c h a r e s u b s u m e d b y a c a u s a l t h e o r y
o f r e f e r e n c e a n d t h e r e f e r e n c e o f a c a u s a l t h e o r y i t s e l f - i s m o r e
a c c u r a t e l y a p o i n t a b o u t c e r t a i n p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r r e f e r e n c e ,
p r e c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h h o l d e q u a l l y f o r a l l i n s t a n c e s o f t h i s n o t i o n . I h a v e
i d e n t i f i e d c e r t a i n n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t s a s f o r m i n g a
p r e c o n d i t i o n o n t h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y a n d i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f r e f e r e n c e . I h a v e
a l s o a r g u e d t h a t t h e c a u s a l t h e o r i s t ' s a c c o u n t o f r e f e r e n c e , i n l a c k i n g a n y
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sari of 'conceptual space' for these normative and epistemic concepts, is,
in the final analysis, impossible and unintelligible. Of course, none of
what I hav e said is intended as a rejection ofVan Cleve's characterisation
of Putnarn's early criticisms of causal theories of reference. But I do think
that Putnarn's recent, and indeed not so recent, view of causal theories of
reference is more likely to frame th e problem with these theories as
being one of their unintelligibility, not as being one of the indeterminacy
of any causal relation advanced by the causalist as the relation of
reference.
* * *
The following proposals of Woods and Hull are typical of the ongoing
dialectic in the an alysis of petitio principii":
A further advantage of this sort of formal approach is that it
demonstrates that , and the extent to which, possession or lack of
target-properties (e.g. circularity) is not a matter of parochial
seman tic status, and not a matter of parochial contextual and
pragmatic features. (Woods 1980, P: 58)
The fallacy of reasoning in vicious circles does not belong to this class
offallacies [formal fallacies]. Instead it is an example of what logicians
call a material fallacy . In diagnosing material fallacies both content and
4 Of all the informal fallacies, petitio principii is the fallacy which has been most extensively
d im m ed in the literature. Johnson and Blair (1985) describe how 'Over the past live years
researchers have been relining the accoun ts of the informal fallacies. Begging the question
continues to be a pre occupation .. .' (p . 186). The five year period to which Johnson and
Blair refer is from I\l78 to 1983. This same preoccupation is again eviden t in Schmidt' s
(1987) bibliography of the fallacies. Begging the question accounts for 28 of the entries, ad
homin em 17, vagueness 7. genetic fallacy 7, composition and division 5, ad baculum 5. ad
igno ran tiarn 3, ad POPUhlll1 3. ad verecundiam 3, ignoratio elenchi 2, man y questions 2,
ambigu ity 2, ad misericord iam 1, gambl er 's fallacy I, and non causa pro causa J. A similar
distribution is to be found in Hans en 's (1990) informal logic bibliography-begging the
question (31) is second only to the category 'all fallacies other than the 'ad ' fallacies and
begging the questi on' (40). Ad hominem and tu quoqne arguments account for 24 of
Hansen's en tries, with ad verecundiam 10, and 'ad ' fallacies other than ad hominem and ad
verecundiam 13.
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t h e u s e t o w h i c h t h e a r g u m e n t i s b e i n g p u t p l a y c e n t r a l r o l e s . ( H u l l
1 9 6 7 , p . 1 7 7 )
H e r e W o o d s a n d H u l l a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t w o f r e q u e n t l y e n c o u n t e r e d
a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f p e t i t i o , t h e o n e f o r m a l i s t i c a n d t h e o t h e r
e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t i c " i n n a t u r e . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n e m p h a s i s
a n d t e r m i n o l o g y , i t i s g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e p r e m i s e s o f a n
a r g u m e n t f u n c t i o n b y p r o v i d i n g s o m e d e g r e e o f s u p p o r t i v e w a r r a n t f o r
t h e c o n c l u s i o n . I n t h i s r e g a r d , a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n v a r i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d
a s c o m m i t t e d t o a p r i n c i p l e o f ' e v i d e n t i a l p r i o r i t y ' , i n w h i c h t h e p r e m i s e s
a r e p r i o r t o , o r b e t t e r k n o w n t h a n , t h e c o n c l u s i o n . " T h i s p r i n c i p l e , w h i l e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f m o s t t y p e s o f a r g u m e n t , i s c l e a r l y v i o l a t e d i n p e t i t i o
p r i n c i p i i r e a s o n i n g - i n t h i s c a s e t h e p r e m i s e s c a n n o t b e e v i d e n t i a l l y
p r i o r t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e a p r o p o s i t i o n i d e n t i c a l t o , a n d h e n c e a s
u n k n o w n a s , t h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e p r e m i s e - s e t ? I t i s
5 I t c o u l d , o f c o u r s e , b e a r g u e d t h a t f o r m a l t h e o r i e s h a v e b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d o f t h e v e r y
n o t i o n s t h a t I a m h e r e d e s c r i b i n g a s ' e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t i c ' , e . g . K a t z ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g .
( P u t n a m h a s c r i t i c i s e d s u c h t h e o r i e s f o r f a i l i n g t o a c c o u n t f o r a n y p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t
n o t i o n . I n r e l a t i o n t o B l o c k ' s C o n c e p t u a l R o l e S e m a n t i c s , h e a r g u e s : ' I h a v e r e m a r k e d a
n u m b e r o f t i m e s t h a t t o i d e n t i f y m e a n i n g w i t h " c o n c e p t u a l r o l e " w o u l d a m o u n t t o a t o t a l
c h a n g e o f t o p i c , a n d n o t t o a n a c c o u n t o f m e a n i n g ' ( 1 9 8 8 , P : 5 3 ) . ) T h r o u g h u s e o f ' e x t r a -
f o r m a l i s t i c ' I i n t e n d o n l y t o c o n v e y a s e n s e o f l e v e l s o f l i n g u i s t i c o r g a n i s a t i o n d i s t i n c t f r o m
t h a t o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e .
6 W a l t o n a n d B a t t e n ( 1 9 8 4 ) d i s c u s s e v i d e n t i a l p r i o r i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o p e t i t i o a r g u m e n t i n t h e
f o l l o w i n g w a y : ' T h e a s s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y w e l l k n o w n n e s s o f A , i n o r d e r t o
m a k e A o f u t i l i t y a s a p r e m i s s , m u s t b e p r i o r t o t h a t o f B . O n c e t h e d e d u c t i o n i s g r a n t e d
h o w e v e r , t h e v a l u e o f B s h o u l d b e a d j u s t e d u p w a r d s t o a p l a u s i b i l i t y v a l u e e q u a l t o ( a n d n o t
g r e a t e r t h a n ) A . O n c e A h a s b e e n s o u t i l i s e d a s a p r e m i s s f o r B h o w e v e r , B c o u l d n e v e r b e
u s e d a s a p r e m i s s i n a n a r g u m e n t t h a t h a s A a s a c o n c l u s i o n . R e a s o n : t o b e u s e f u l a s a
p r e m i s s , t h e v a l u e o f B m u s t b e g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t o f A . B u t a s w a s j u s t s h o w n a b o v e , t h e
v a l u e o f B s h o u l d n o t b e g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t o f A , i f A h a s b e e n u s e d a s a p r e m i s s f o r B i n a
p r e v i o u s d e d u c t i o n . T h u s a r g u i n g i n a c i r c l e , f r o m A t o B , a n d t h e n s u b s e q u e n t l y f r o m B t o
A , v i o l a t e s s o m e r e q u i r e m e n t o f e v i d e n t i a l p r i o r i t y ' ( p . 1 5 4 ) .
7 T h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f p e t i t i o p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s d i s c u s s e d b y W o o d s a n d W a l t o n
( 1 9 8 2 ) i n t e r m s o f t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s : a d e p e n d e n c y v e r s u s a n e q u i u a l e n c e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e
f a l l a c y a n d a n e p i s t em i c a s o p p o s e d t o a g a m e - t h e o r e t i c m o d e l o f a n a l y s i s . W h i l e t h e a c c o u n t i n
t h e t e x t i s m o s t a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e W o o d s - W a l t o n d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e e q u i u o l e n c e
c o n c e p t i o n a n d t h e e p i s t e m i c m o d e l , t h e s e a u t h o r s a r e a t p a i n s t o e m p h a s i s e w h a t t h e y t a k e
t o b e t h e e q u i u a l e n c e b a s i s o f t h e d e p e n d e n c y c o n c e p t i o n . T h e y d e s c r i b e t h i s a s a r e j e c t i o n o f
t . h e i r o r i g i n a l d e p e n d e n cy / e q u i v a l e n c e d i s t i n c t i o n a s d e t a i l e d i n W o o d s a n d W a l t . o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
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different responses to the question of what factors to include III the
identification of this proposition that divide theorists along the
formalistic/extra-formalistic lines indicated above.
I want to examine the type of formal approach described above by
Woods. At a slightly earlier point in the same article, Woods describes
certain prerequisites for the formal treatment of a body of knowledge:
Perhaps it may be assumed that a body of knowledge is non-trivially
eligible for formal treatment when (1) the objects of theory enter into
interesting systematic interconnections expressible in functional or
quasi-functional ways, and (2) such interconnections obtain or not, as
the case may be, under semantic suppression ofthe connected items. (1980,
p.57)
In relation to petltlO argument, this formal approach results in
'Arguments of the form "p, therefore p" ... [the] formal validity [of
which] is impeccably reflected in standard first-order logic' (Woods and
Walton, 1975, p. 107). My point is not to deny the formal validity of 'p,
therefore p', but to indicate that the formal validity of this case rests on
the fact that one and the same proposition forms both the premise and the
conclusion of the argument. Moreover, sameness in this context is not
the sameness of graphemes, the sense in which premise p is the same
grapheme as conclusion p, nor is it the sameness of grapheme sequences,
the sense in which the grapheme sequence which forms premise p is the
same as the grapheme sequence which forms conclusion p. Sameness is
used here in relation to propositions, linguistic constructions which
admit of truth or falsity through the representation (or lack of
representation, as the case may be) of certain states of affairs. Also,
sameness presupposes the notion of difference, a difference not of
graphemes and of grapheme sequences, but of the states of affairs
represented by propositions. The crux of the problem for the formalist is
this: what does an ability to distinguish states of affairs come to other
than an ability to refer through the use oflanguage? Yet reference is our
paradigm semantic notion, not to mention the related notions of
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d t r u t h . C l e a r l y , t h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t i s n o t a b l e t o
a c h i e v e t h e s u p p r e s s i o n o f s e m a n t i c s r e q u i r e d b y h i s a p p r o a c h .
T h e o b j e c t i o n j u s t o u t l i n e d i s a n o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t o n e t y p e o f f o r m a l
m e t h o d , t h a t o f f o r m a l l o g i c . C r i t i c i s m t o o k t h e f o r m o f t h e c l a i m t h a t
t h i s u s e o f f o r m a l t e c h n i q u e s , f a r f r o m o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e s u p p r e s s i o n
o f s e m a n t i c n o t i o n s , a c t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d s u c h n o t i o n s . O n e r e s p o n s e t o
t h i s c l a i m c o u l d b e t o e m p h a s i s e t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f o t h e r f o r m a l m e t h o d s ,
m e t h o d s w h i c h , i t m a y b e a r g u e d , a r e l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e t o a c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s
s o r t . I n t h i s w a y , I n o w t u r n t o e x a m i n i n g a f u r t h e r k i n d o f f o r m a l
a p p r o a c h , t h a t p u r s u e d b y c e r t a i n b r a n c h e s o f l i n g u i s t i c s .
8
L i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s e s h a v e f e a t u r e d i n v a r i o u s w a y s i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f
p e t i t i o a r g u m e n t . I r v i n g C o p i ( 1 9 7 2 ) , f o r e x a m p l e , l o o k s t o t h e
o r t h o g r a p h y f o r a c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i , o n l y
t o r e j e c t a n y o r t h o g r a p h i c b a s i s f o r t h i s f a l l a c y :
I f o n e a s s u m e s a s a p r e m i s s f o r h i s a r g u m e n t t h e v e r y c o n c l u s i o n h e
i n t e n d s t o p r o v e , t h e f a l l a c y c o m m i t t e d i s t h a t o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i , o r
b e g g i n g t h e q u e s t i o n . I f . t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d i s
f o r m u l a t e d i n e x a c t l y t h e s a m e w o r d s b o t h a s p r e m i s s a n d a s
c o n c l u s i o n , t h e m i s t a k e w o u l d b e s o g l a r i n g a s t o d e c e i v e n o o n e .
O f t e n , h o w e v e r , t w o f o r m u l a t i o n s c a n b e s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t t o
o b s c u r e t h e f a c t t h a t o n e a n d t h e s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n o c c u r s b o t h a s
p r e m i s s a n d c o n c l u s i o n . ( p . 8 3 )
I n t h i s c a s e , a n a r g u m e n t i s t a k e n t o b e g t h e q u e s t i o n w h e n t h e
o r t h o g r a p h i c f o r m o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n ( t h e s e q u e n t i a l a r r a n g e m e n t o f
g r a p h e m e s ) i s r e p l i c a t e d b y o n e o f t h e p r e m i s e s . A d d i t i o n a l f o r m a l
( s y n t a c t i c ) d e s c r i p t i o n s c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e
m o r p h o l o g i c a l a n d g r a m m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . T h e i s s u e
t h e n b e c o m e s o n e o f a s s e s s i n g t h e a d e q u a c y o f o r t h o g r a p h i c i d e n t i t y , a s
w e l l a s t h e s e o t h e r s y n t a c t i c c r i t e r i a , t o t h e t a s k o f p e t i t i o a n a l y s i s .
I ; J a v o i d d i s c u s s i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i e s o f g r a m m a t i c a l s y n t a x . e t c . , a s t h e s e a r e o f l i m i t e d
r e l e v a n c e t o t h e m o r e g e n e r a l n a t u r e o f m y a c c o u n t .
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As part of this assessment it will be instructive to examine the
formalist's position in the light of the dualist claims that have been raised
thus far. It was discussed above how, in the absence of extrinsic causal
relations, the philosopher of mind was compelled to describe perceptual
experiences and thoughts in terms of a certain intrinsic syntactic
stru cture. The picture presented was one in which our cognitive powers
extended as far as a conceptual interface which, while syntactically
analysable, was devoid of all content (meaning). Now, it is the specific
claim of the formal theorist of petitio principii that a syntactic
description of thi s interface is alone necessary and sufficient for the
analysis of petitio. However, such a view fails our clearest understanding
of what constitutes petitio reasoning. For it is unexceptional for
propositions exhibiting identical syntactic structures to appear as
pr emise and conclusion in a non-question-begging argument:"
The castle is larger than the mansion.
The man sion is larger than the cottage.
Therefore, the castle is larger th an the cottage.
Here the morphological and grammatical identity of conclusion and
premises is insufficient to warrant a description of this argument as
question-begging. 10 Moreover, it emerges that syntactic identity of
9 It may be argued that a question-begging SU'ategy has been ad opted in the present
con text, as cer ta in characterisa tions of thi s fallacy have simply been assumed when it is the
very character of petitio that is itself at issue. However, such an objection misrepresents the
type of approach being developed, with the pattern of justification assuming a spiral as
opposed to circular form. Given a pre analytic understanding of petitio, we can proceed to
descr ibe an argument in terms of a number of conceptual di stinctions. The results of this
initial analysis serve to transform in kind our understanding of this fallacy. This
enligh tened un derstanding leads in tu rn to the formulation of further con ceptual
d istinctions and so the process con tinues, with each sta ge of justification returning our
unders tanding of petitio to ever increased levels of sophistication and refin ement.
10 Using or tho graphic iden tity here would produce a somewhat different resu lt-
syn tactically distinct propositions would th en coexist with our understanding of this
argument as non-quesuon -begging. While thi s would represent a welcome turn of events
fin the formal th eori st of petitio, there is reas on to bel ieve th at orthograp hic identity would
not be a particularl y valuable line of investig ation: 'If the proposition to be established is
formu lated in exac tly the same words both as premiss and as conclus ion. the mi stake would
9 2
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p r e m i s e a n d c o n c l u s i o n f a i l s a s e v e n a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f p e t i t i o
a r g u m e n t :
[ T o ] a l l o w e v e r y m a n a n u n b o u n d e d f r e e d o m o f s p e e c h m u s t a l w a y s
b e , o n t h e w h o l e , a d v a n t a g e o u s t o t h e S t a t e ; f o r i t i s h i g h l y c o n d u c i v e
t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e C o m m u n i t y , t h a t e a c h i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d e n j o y a
l i b e r t y p e r f e c t l y u n l i m i t e d , o f e x p r e s s i n g h i s s e n t i m e n t s . ( W h a t e l y
1 8 3 6 , p . 2 2 3 )
D e s c r i b e d b y W h a t e l y ( 1 8 3 6 ) a s q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , t h e a b o v e a r g u m e n t
c o n t a i n s a s i n g l e p r e m i s e w h i c h i s s y n t a c t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e
c o n c l u s i o n .
Y e t f o r a l l t h i s t h e f o r m a l i s t m a y r e s p o n d t h a t a s i m p l e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n
o f s y n t a c t i c c r i t e r i a w i l l s u f f i c e t o a c c o u n t f o r a l l c a s e s o f p e t i t i o
a r g u m e n t . H e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e f o r m a l i s t h a s m i s u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e o f
t h e o b j e c t o r ' s c r i t i c i s m , t h a t n o s e n s e c a n e v e n b e g i v e n t o s u c h
s y n t a c t i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d r e l a t i o n s a s a p r e m i s e ' s b e i n g c o n f i r m e d e t c . , i n
t h e a b s e n c e , w h i c h i s s o c e n t r a l a t e n e t o f t h e f o r m a l a p p r o a c h , o f p r i o r
n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t s . T h e p r o o f o f t h i s w i l l b e t h a t f o r e v e r y
s y n t a c t i c d e s c r i p t i o n i n t e n d e d t o c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a
p r e m i s e , s o m e w i d e r n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r w a r r a n t w i l l b e
p r e s u p p o s e d ! ' b y t h a t s y n t a c t i c d e s c r i p t i o n . I n t h i s r e g a r d , c o n s i d e r
b e s o g l a r i n g a s t o d e c e i v e n o o n e ' ( C o p i 1 9 7 2 , 4 t h e d n ) , I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s o u r c h o i c e o f
a c r i t e r i o n o f s y n t a c t i c i d e n t i t y m u s t b e o n e w h i c h p r e s e r v e s t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s u c c e s s o f t h i s
f a l l a c y r e q u i r e s t h a t i t s a s s u m e d p r e m i s e r e m a i n u n d e t e c t e d . I n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e t h e m e o f
t h e t e x t , o u r n o t i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s s u c c e s s f o r t h i s f a l l a c y i s i t s e l f p a r t o f a w i d e r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p e t i t i o a r g u m e n t .
1 1 T h e b a s i s o f t h i s p o s i t i o n c a n b e f o u n d i n t h e m e a n i n g h o l i s m a r g u m e n t s o f W . V .
Q u i n e . I n ' E p i s t e m o l o g y N a t u r a l i z e d ' , Q u i n e e x p l a i n s t h e p r o b l e m f o r t h e p o s i t i v i s t s '
r e d u c t i o n i s t a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g a s f o l l o w s : ' H o w i s t h i s i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y [ o f t h e e m p i r i c a l
m e a n i n g s o f t y p i c a l s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ] t o b e e x p l a i n e d ? S i m p l y o n t h e
g r o u n d t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a t y p i c a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t b o d i e s a r e t o o
c o m p l e x f o r f i n i t e a x i o m a t i z a t i o n , h o w e v e r l e n g t h y ? N o : I h a v e a d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n . I t
i s t h a t t h e t y p i c a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t b o d i e s h a s n o f u n d o f e x p e r i e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i t c a n c a l l
i t s o w n . A s u b s t a n t i a l m a s s o f t h e o r y , t a k e n t o g e t h e r , w i l l c o m m o n l y h a v e e x p e r i e n t i a l
i m p l i c a t i o n s ; t h i s i s h o w w e m a k e v e r i f i a b l e p r e d i c t i o n s . W e m a y n o t b e a b l e t o e x p l a i n w h y
w e a r r i v e a t t h e o r i e s w h i c h m a k e s u c c e s s f u l p r e d i c t i o n s , b u t w e d o a r r i v e a t s u c h t h e o r i e s '
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again the first example discussed above. There it was argued that
syntactic identity was insufficient to warrant a description of this
argument as question-begging. It was also indicated, if somewhat briefly,
that syn tactic identity failed 'our clearest understanding of what
constitutes petitio reasoning'. Moreover, in the same context I described
this understanding as 'preanalytic', in an attempt to convey what I see as
its intuitive basis. Now, given thi s preanalytic understanding, one might
proceed to justify the assessment of the first example as non-question-
begging in the following way."
It appears unproblematic to describe an argument as question-
begging when one of its premises depends in whole or in part upon
its conclusion for supportive warrant. Yet this clearly fails to accord
with a certain understanding we have of the evidential relationships at
work in the first argument above. For we can conceive of how
perceptual evidence would confirm the premise 'the castle is larger
than the mansion'-we can simply look and see that such is the case
(we may, of course, need to perform various measurements, etc.),
What we cannot imagine, however, is how simply assuming the truth
of the conclusion can contribute in any significant way to a
j ustification of this premise. For the conclusion in conjunction with
the second premise (a known premise) is insufficient to justify the
proposition 'the castle is larger than the mansion'-this proposition
mu st itself be assumed in order to assimilate the information
contained separately in the second premise and conclusion. Yet it is
this very proposition which we are attempting to justify. The latter
(1\/6\/, p . 79). Given the need for a notion of same ness of meaning in petitio analysis, the
convergen ce of petitio theory on the issues of meaning holism is to be exp ected.
12 At this basic level of justification the role of notions such as confirmation and evidence
has been left delib er ately undeveloped (' . .. we can conceive of how perceptual evidence
would confirm the pr em ise .. .'), In this way, I avoid pre-empting later discussion of the
holistic nature of these concepts and , more impor tan tly, I represent this justification as an
initial stage in petitio inqu iry (see footnote 9).
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p a t t e r n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t o f a c i r c l e , i n s h o r t t h e f a l l a c y o f
b e g g i n g t h e q u e s t i o n .
P u t t i n g a s i d e a c l e a r d i f f e r e n c e i n d i r e c t i o n o f a n a l y s i s , I S I w a n t t o a r g u e
t h a t t h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t o f p e t i t i o c a n n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f o f t h e a b o v e
j u s t i f i c a t o r y d i s c o u r s e . I t i s n o t t h e c a s e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s o f t h i s
j u s t i f i c a t i o n a r e u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e f o r m a l i s t - i t i s n o p a r t o f h i s
p o s i t i o n t o r e j e c t t h e i d e a t h a t w e c a n h a v e e v i d e n c e f o r a p r e m i s e o r
e v e n t h a t s o m e e v i d e n c e e x c e e d s o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n p o i n t o f p l a u s i b i l i t y ,
r e l e v a n c e , e t e . I t i s r a t h e r t h a t n o s y n t a c t i c a p p r o a c h c a n a s s i m i l a t e w i t h i n
i t s a n a l y s i s t h e e s s e n t i a l l y h o l i s t i c n a t u r e o f t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C o n s i d e r ,
f o r e x a m p l e , t h e i n t e r p l a y o f e p i s t e m i c a n d n o r m a t i v e f a c t o r s w i t h i n t h e
a b o v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e ' t h e c a s t l e i s
l a r g e r t h a n t h e m a n s i o n ' p r o c e e d e d o n t h e b a s i s o f p e r c e p t u a l e v i d e n c e .
I n o w w a n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n ' o f s u c h e v i d e n c e i s g u i d e d i n
l a r g e p a r t b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f r e l e v a n c e , s u c h t h a t m e a s u r e m e n t s o f
h e i g h t a n d t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f a s h o o t i n g s t a r a r e j u d g e d t o b e r e l e v a n t
a n d i r r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t i v e l y t o t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h i s p r e m i s e . H o w e v e r ,
r e l e v a n c e i s n o t a n i s o l a t e d n o t i o n b u t o n e w h i c h i s f u r t h e r d e p e n d e n t o n
t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g - t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l e v a n c e o f e v i d e n c e x i s t o
u n d e r s t a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h e c o n t e n t o f x b e a r s u p o n t h e c o n t e n t o f a
p r o p o s i t i o n y . T h e d e p e n d e n c y o f r e l e v a n c e e x t e n d s s t i l l f u r t h e r i n t o a n
a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h i s e v i d e n c e i s a d d u c e d . T h i s i s n o t
1 3 O f c o u r s e , t h e f o r m a l i s t w i l l h a v e a p r e a n a l y t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h i s f i r s t e x a m p l e a s
q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g a n d h e w i l l p r o d u c e a r g u m e n t s t o t h a t e f f e c t d u r i n g a n a l y s i s ( w h i l e I a l s o
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w i l l f a i l t o v a l i d a t e h i s p r e a n a l y t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m y s t r a t e g y
h e r e i s t o u s e t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r a c t i c e i n d e f e a t o f h i s c l a i m s ) . H o w e v e r , g i v e n
t h a t w e s h a r e t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s p e t i t i o r e a s o n i n g ( o t h e r w i s e w e a r e
n o t e v e n d i s c u s s i n g t h e s a m e s u b j e c t ) , a c o n t e n t i o n , w h i c h I c o n s i d e r t o b e u n p r o b l e m a t i c ,
i s t h a t s i m i l a r c o n c e p t s w i l l e m e r g e i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s a d v a n c e d b y e a c h o f u s i n s u p p o r t o f
o u r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s . T h i s f o l l o w s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t s u c h j u s t i f i c a t i o n s c a n b e a s s e s s e d a s
d i s p l a y i n g p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e v a l u e s a l o n g v a r i o u s p a r a m e t e r s , e . g . t h e d ep e n d e n c y o f a
p r e m i s e o n a c o n c l u s i o n . A n e g a t i v e v a l u e f o r a p a r a m e t e r d o e s n o t i m p l y t h e a b s e n c e o f
t h a t p a r a m e t e r w i t h i n j u s t i f i c a t o r y d i s c o u r s e : a n a l y s i s o f a n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g a r g u m e n t
r o u l d q u i t e r e a s o n a b l y i n c l u d e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e s a s r e c e i v i n g s u p p o r t i v e
w a r r a n t w h i c h i s i 1u1 e pe 1 l d e l l l o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n .
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'pur pose ' in some narrow sense, in which evidence is selected for its
relevance to the confirmation of a particular proposition or premise, the
sense that we have just discussed. For it is also the case that the larger
inquiries of which this confirmation is but one component can also
determine what is to constitute relevance within that context. For
example, measurements of height might be irrelevant to the
confirma tion of the premise 'the castle is larger than the mansion' , when
this confirma tion is part of a quantity surveyor's inquiry, an inquiry in
which the size of a building is assessed in terms of the area of land that it
covers. In fact, the assessment of evidence as relevant to the confirmation
of a proposition and as relevant to the wider inquiry of which that
confirmation is a part is an assessment which is distinctly normative in
nature-in both cases, a statement is being made concerning the adequacy
of evidence to particular tasks. Moreover, the factors discussed thus far
would feature equally in an analysis of the second example above, where
a relation of synonymy (sameness of meaning) between premise and
conclusion is intimately connected with the normative assessment of this
argument as fallacious . Also, the identification of fallacy presupposes a
wider purpose of argument, the proof of a previously unknown
proposition , a purpose which has not been fulfilled in the case of this
second example. In short, the above justificatory discourse can only be
understood in terms of an entire network of concepts, and not some
syn tactically described component of that network. 14
Of course, the formalist may concede the holistic nature of the above
justificatory discourse, but then deny that such a justification plays any
role in petitio argument- after all, his concern is to explain syntactic
idlmtily be tween premise and conclusion, not this holistic notion of
justification . But insofar as he is prepared to discuss identity in relation
to a premise and a con clusion , he must further countenance a wider con text
of argument along with all of its attendant concepts. The relation of
14 For furt her d iscussion of these issues, see 'Meaning and Mentalism' in Putn am's
Representation arul R eality .
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i d e n t i t y i s a t l e a s t a s p r o b l e m a t i c f o r t h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t o f p e t i t i o a s w a s
t h e e a r l i e r n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
N o w o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n , I w a n t t o a r g u e t h a t
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a c o m p l e x n o t i o n , o n e w h i c h o w e s i t s p o s s i b i l i t y t o t h e p r i o r
e x i s t e n c e o f a r a n g e o f i n t e r r e l a t e d c o n c e p t s . T h i s r a n g e o f c o n c e p t s , I
w a n t t o a r g u e f u r t h e r , c o n f e r s s e n s e o n t h e n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t i s ,
i t i s o n l y o n t h e b a s i s o f o u r h a v i n g s o m e p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t
c o n s t i t u t e s n o t i o n s s u c h a s r e l e v a n c e a n d p u r p o s e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f
a r g u m e n t t h a t w e c a n e v e n c l a i m t o m a k e s e n s e o f t h e n o t i o n o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n a r g u m e n t . H o w e v e r , w h e r e o n t h e v i e w o f
a r g u m e n t a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t I a m p r o p o s i n g , a v a s t r a n g e o f c o n c e p t s
n o t o n l y c o n s t i t u t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , b u t a l s o
d e t e r m i n e s t h e s e n s e o f t h i s n o t i o n , t h e f o r m a l i s t s e e s e i t h e r n o r o l e o r
o n l y a s u p e r f l u o u s r o l e f o r t h e s e c o n c e p t s w i t h i n h i s a c c o u n t o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . J u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h e f o r m a l i s t w i l l a r g u e , i s a c i r c u m s c r i b e d
c o n c e p t , a n d a s s u c h i s n o t d e p e n d e n t o n o t h e r c o n c e p t s e i t h e r f o r i t s
o w n p o s s i b i l i t y o r f o r i t s s e n s e . G i v e n t h e c i r c u m s c r i b e d c h a r a c t e r o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o n t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s a c c o u n t o f t h i s n o t i o n , a s y n t a c t i c
a p p r o a c h , w h i c h o p e r a t e s o n ' o b j e c t s o f t h e o r y ' w h i c h a r e ' u n d e r
s e m a n t i c s u p p r e s s i o n ' ( c f . W o o d s ( 1 9 8 0 ) a b o v e ) , i s i d e a l l y s u i t e d ,
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f o r m a l i s t , t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n
a r g u m e n t . T h i s l a s t c l a i m o f t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s i s u n p r o b l e m a t i c i n d e e d - i f i t
i s i n f a c t t h e c a s e t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n c a n b e c i r c u m s c r i b e d , t h a t i s , c a n b e
s h o w n t o b e i n d e p e n d e n t o f a l l o t h e r c o n c e p t s , t h e n a s y n t a c t i c
a p p r o a c h , a n d a s y n t a c t i c a p p r o a c h a l o n e , i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e a n a l y s i s
o f t h e n o t i o n o f a r g u m e n t a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H o w e v e r , w h a t i s
p r o b l e m a t i c , I b e l i e v e , i s t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a c i r c u m s c r i b e d
c o n c e p t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s e v e n p o s s i b l e . I n o r d e r t o d e m o n s t r a t e n o t o n l y
t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c i r c u m s c r i b e d c o n c e p t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , b u t a l s o t h e
' l l n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f s u c h a c o n c e p t - I d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r t h a t n o s e n s e c a n
e v e n b e g i v e n t o s u c h s y n t a c t i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d r e l a t i o n s a s a p r e m i s e ' s
b e i n g c o n f i r m e d e t c . , i n t h e a b s e n c e . . . o f p r i o r n o r m a t i v e a n d e p i s t e m i c
c o n c e p t s - t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r a c t i c e o f t h e f o r m a l i s t m u s t b e e x a m i n e d .
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Such an examination was undertaken above, in the case of the petitio
the orist's attempt to justify his normative assessment of an argument.
This normative assessmen t de alt with the issue of whether an argument
was question-begging or non-question-begging in nature, an issue which
provided, in effect, an opportunity for the analysis of the justification
relation within argu ment. Now, in attempting to justify his normative
assessmen t of an argument, the petitio theorist was shown to appeal to a
range of concep ts, concepts which are normally implicit in the
justification relation of an argument. These concepts are not unique to a
particular theoretical po sition, but instead underpin the normative and
epis ternic j udgemen ts engaged in by both the formalist and the non-
form alist in an attempt to justify the normative assessment of an
argument. These concepts, I want to argue, are strictly necessary in
nature-they represent a precondition on the very possibility and
intelligibility of the notion of j us tification . Something of the necessary
character of these concep ts can be demonstrated by examining the
impact of their absence on the notion of justification. In th e absence of
the se concep ts, a justification of the normative assessment of an
argument is not possible-we can' only assert that a particular argument is
question-begging or is not question-begging (and even thi s is doubtful,
given that assertion, on the view that I am proposing, presupposes the
same normative and epistemic concepts that are presupposed by
justification) but we cannot say why an argument is question-begging or is
not question-begging. Also in the absence of these concepts, no sense can
be made of the notion of justification in the case of a normative
assessme nt of an argument-justification is only recognisable as such in
the presence of concep ts which make it possible to distinguish thi s notion
from closely rel ated notions such as explanation. In short, by describing
these concep ts as a precondition on the very possibility an d intelligibility
of the notion of justification, I am claiming that in their absence we are
not dealing with a different notion of justification; rather we are not
dealing with justification at all.
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I n t h e s a m e w a y , I w a n t t o a r g u e t h a t t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i s
c e n t r a l t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m - t h a t a s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
r e l a t i o n o f p e t i t i o a r g u m e n t i s p o s s i b l e - i s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h
p r e s u p p o s e s e p i s t e m i c a n d n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s , i n f a c t p r e s u p p o s e s t h e
s a m e e p i s t e m i c a n d n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s w h i c h w e r e s h o w n a b o v e t o b e
p r e s u p p o s e d b y t h e r e l a t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n a n a r g u m e n t ( i f w e a r e
t a l k i n g a b o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n a t a l l , t h i s l a s t c l a i m m u s t b e t r u e ) . Y e t i t i s j u s t
a t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s a c c o u n t , w h e n t h e f o r m a l i s t c o m e s t o a
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i s o w n t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m , t h a t t h e s e l f - r e f u t i n g n a t u r e o f
t h a t a c c o u n t b e c o m e s e v i d e n t . F o r i f , a s t h e f o r m a l i s t i s c l a i m i n g , a
s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n o f q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g
a r g u m e n t a n d , b y l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n , o f n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g a r g u m e n t ,
i s p o s s i b l e , t h e n a t t h e v e r y l e a s t a s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
r e l a t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t w h i c h i s r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h e
f o r m a l i s t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m , m u s t b e p o s s i b l e . H o w e v e r , a s t h e d i s c u s s i o n
t o d a t e i s i n t e n d e d t o s h o w , j u s t s u c h a s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s i s n o t p o s s i b l e :
t h r o u g h i t s d e n i a l o f t h e n e c e s s a r y p r i o r i t y o f e p i s t e m i c a n d n o r m a t i v e
c o n c e p t s w i t h i n i t s a n a l y s i s , t h e s y n t a c t i c a p p r o a c h i s e f f e c t i v e l y d e n y i n g
t h e v e r y c o n c e p t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a p r e c o n d i t i o n o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y a n d
t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s f a c e d w i t h a d i l e m m a w h i c h i s n o t u n l i k e t h e d i l e m m a
w h i c h i s f a c e d b y t h e c a u s a l t h e o r i s t o f r e f e r e n c e : h e m u s t e i t h e r c o n c e d e
t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y a n d t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f h i s c e n t r a l t h e o r e t i c a l
c l a i m - t h a t a s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n o f q u e s t i o n -
b e g g i n g a r g u m e n t i s p o s s i b l e - o r h e c a n d e c l a r e h i s c e n t r a l t h e o r e t i c a l
c l a i m t o b e j u s t i f i e d , b u t i n s o d o i n g h e i s m a k i n g u s e o f a n o t i o n o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o h i m f r o m w i t h i n h i s s y n t a c t i c
a p p r o a c h . T h e f o r m a l t h e o r i s t ' s o n l y r o u t e o f e s c a p e f r o m t h i s d i l e m m a
i s t o f o r e g o e v e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a n d
t o p u r s u e i n i t s p l a c e a h o l i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h i s n o t i o n , a n a n a l y s i s i n
w h i c h t h e ' o p e n t e x t u r e ' o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s e m p h a s i s e d .
I w a n t t o s u m m a r i s e a t t h i s s t a g e w h a t I a m p r e s e n t i n g a s
u n a c c e p t a b l e w i t h i n t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . T h e f o r m a l i s t i s p r o p o s i n g a
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form al analysis of petitio principii, an analysis in terms of the structural
prop erties of the component propositions of this fallacy. In specific
terms, this amounts to the claim that syntactic structures can simply
supplan t notions like evidence and justification, notions which are
central to an understanding of petitio as a type of argumentative failure.
It ha s been my contention that no analysis of intentional notions such as
evidence and justification can proceed in the manner envisaged by the
formalist. I demonstrated this in the following way. I examined how
justificatory discourse, in fact the very justificatory discourse used by the
formalist to validate his theoretical claim, appealed to an entire network
of concepts and I further suggested that no syntactic relation could both
coincide with the 'open texture' of such a justification and comply with
the restrictive nature of a syntactic analysis. The critical challenge is
again that of a self-refu tation '<e-if the justification pattern of petitio
argume n t is a syn tactic relation, then a syn tactic relation fails as a
justification of this fact. In this way, justification cannot be a syntactic
relation. Hence, it is false that justification is a syntactic relation. This
self-refutation is the direct result of the attempt to pursue an explanation
of intentional notions in strictly 'non-intentional (in thi s case , syn tactic)
terms. I have called thi s project one of reductionism and hav e indicated
th at I view it as being fundamentally misconceived, given that an
explanation of intentionality must first make use of intentional notions
(cr. 'use' in later Wittgenstein). It is with these considerations in mind
that I now turn to the claims of the extra-formalist.
For the extra-formalist, content (mean ing) emerges as an essential
concept in the an alysis of petitio argument. As such , the extra-formalist is
concerned to explain what he views as the question-begging nature of the
second example above in terms of a synonymy relation between premise
and conclusion. Within the con text of a dualist conception of mind 16_a
15 Putnarn devel op s a similar self-refutation criti cism aga ins t logical positivism in 'Two
conceptions of ration ality' in Reason. Trut h mu} History.
16 Putnam has argued that thi s particular con ception of mind represents a largely
uni n terrupted line of tho ug h t since certai n developmen ts in empiricism . For a d iscussion of
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p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f b o t h t h e e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t ' s a n d t h e f o r m a l i s t ' s
p o s i t i o n s - t h e e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t ' s n o t i o n o f c o n t e n t a m o u n t s t o a c l a i m
a b o u t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c a u s a l l i n k s . I n t h i s w a y , i t i s h e l d t h a t c o n t e n t c a n
b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f a c a u s a l m e c h a n i s m , o n e i n w h i c h v a r i o u s
i n t e r f a c e s , t h e m s e l v e s s y n t a c t i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d , a r e c a u s a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n
( a r e ' c a u s e d ' b y ) f e a t u r e s o f r e a l i t y . ' C a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n ' h a s a l r e a d y b e e n
d i s c u s s e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f D e v i t t ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h e p e r m u t a t i o n
( m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c ) a r g u m e n t s o f P u t n a m . T h e c o n c l u s i o n t o e m e r g e f r o m
t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w a s t h a t c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n f a i l e d t o ' s i n g l e o u t ' a u n i q u e
r e l a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e a n d , a f o r t i o r i , f a i l e d t o a d d r e s s t h e p r o b l e m o f
r e f e r e n t i a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y , t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f w h i c h h a d b e e n i t s v e r y r a i s o n
d ' e t r e . I s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e b a s i s o f t h i s f a i l u r e l a y i n t h e n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l
n a t u r e o f t h e n a t u r a l i s t i c / p h y s i c a l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s w h i c h w e r e c a l l e d u p o n a s
a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e . G i v e n h i s c o m m i t m e n t t o a c a u s a l i s t
f o r m o f e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t i s s i m i l a r l y a t a l o s s t o a c c o u n t
f o r h i s n o t i o n o f m e a n i n g . I f h e i n c l u d e s w i t h i n h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f
m e a n i n g a n y o b j e c t o r s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w h i c h s t a n d s i n a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n
t o a t h o u g h t o r p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e ( a c a u s a l l i n k i s , a f t e r a l l , a t y p e o f
p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n ) , t h e n c a u s e s w i l l e m e r g e i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e
c o n t e n t o f a t h o u g h t w h i c h a r e i n n o i n t e l l i g i b l e s e n s e p a r t o f t h a t
t h o u g h t ' s m e a n i n g . I f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t a t t e m p t s t o
r e s t r i c t t h e c a u s e s t h a t h e i s p r e p a r e d t o c o u n t e n a n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e
m e a n i n g o f a t h o u g h t , t h e n t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t h e i s a b l e t o d o s o i n d i c a t e s
t h a t h e m u s t alread~ b e i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a p r i o r c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g .
T h e n g i v e n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l n a t u r e o f h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e e x t r a - f o r m a l i s t
c a n n o l o n g e r c l a i m t h a t h e i s p u r s u i n g a n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l a c c o u n t o f
m e a n i n g .
A s f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e s e f a c t o r s , c o n s i d e r a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h
y o u a r e p r e p a r i n g a n e x h i b i t i o n o n E n g l i s h a r c h i t e c t u r e i n t h e M i d d l e
A g e s . A t o n e s t a g e i n y o u r r e s e a r c h o f t h i s t o p i c , t h e t h o u g h t t h a t ' t h e
w h a t h e t a k e s t o b e t h e o r i g i n o f t h e m i n d / b o d y p r o b l e m , s e e ' H o w O l d I s t h e M i n d ? ' i n
W o r d s a n d L i f e .
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castle is larger than the mansion' comes to mind. If we were to pursue a
causalist explanation of the meaning of this thought, a large number of
scenarios-a drawing in a child's picture book, a piece of text in a
historical volume, the actual estate of a French nobleman-eould enter
into this account, and no one of these situations could assume greater
significance in this explanation than the others. Yet, as a matter of fact,
your only causal interaction in this case is with the historical volume. Of
course, it may be argued that only causal relations of the relevant type
should feature in an assessment of meaning. However, given previous
discussion about the relationship between relevance and meaning, it
appears that if we are able to state in what a relevant cause would consist,
then meaning has not been explained, but simply presupposed. The
difficulty with causalist accounts of meaning is not that there are no links
of this nature between our mental experiences and thoughts on the one
hand and features of reality on the other, but that there are too many
such links and we lack any method of singling out the appropriate causal
relation-any method, that is, which does not itself make use of the
notion-to-be-explained.!?
The extra-formalist may respond at this point by changing the locus
of his causalist account of meaning. He may argue that by including
sense data-the essential feature of which is that they are contained
within the mind/brain-in a causalist explanation of meaning, the
multiplication of causal states, which vitiated his original claims, could
then be avoided. However, given the syntactic nature of these sense data;"
it is difficult to see how this particular move avoids any of the problems
described above. For it is the case that any sense datum that we would
17 'Two philosophical perspectives' in Reason, Truth and History and 'Realism without
Absolutes' in Words and Life address these issues.
18 Traditionally, sense data have been viewed as constituting an unconceptualised interface
between the inner processes of mind and the entities of the external world. Their supposed
unconceptualised nature encouraged the acceptance of the view that sense data guaranteed
the objectivity of the knowledge based upon them. Within the present context, in appealing
to sense data, themselves syntactically analysable, to explain meaning, the similarity with
the formalist's analysis of meaning and other intentional notions is clear.
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c a u s a l l y c o u n t e n a n c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o a t h o u g h t m u s t i t s e l f i n t e r a c t w i t h a
v a s t b a c k g r o u n d o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e . I n t h i s w a y , w e c a n a f f i r m ' t h e
c a s t l e i s l a r g e r t h a n t h e m a n s i o n ' , b e c a u s e a c e r t a i n a r r a n g e m e n t o f s e n s e
d a t a i s o b s e r v e d t o o c c u r . Y e t s u c h a n a f f i r m a t i o n i s i t s e l f d e p e n d e n t o n
o u r k n o w i n g t h e s i g n i j " z c a n c e o f t h e s e d a t a . A s b e f o r e , m e a n i n g i s
p r e s u p p o s e d r a t h e r t h a n e x p l a i n e d .
I c o n t e n d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t
i n d i c a t e t h e n e e d t o a b a n d o n t h e f o r m / c o n t e n t d i c h o t o m y i n t h e a n a l y s i s
o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i . A l s o , I t a k e t h e s e s a m e a r g u m e n t s t o d e f e a t a n y
p o s i t i o n " t h a t h a s a s i t s b a s i s t h e d u a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f m i n d t h a t h a s
b e e n d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n r e l a t i o n t o p e t i t i o r e a s o n i n g . A s i n d i c a t e d a b o v e ,
i t i s p a r t o f t h i s d u a l i s m t h a t o u r c o n c e p t u a l p o w e r s c a n n o t e x t e n d a s f a r
a s o b j e c t s o f r e a l i t y , t h a t a n i n t e r f a c e e x i s t s b e t w e e n e n t i t i e s o f t h e m i n d
a n d o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e r e d u c t i o n i s t , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o b r i d g e t h e
g u l f c r e a t e d b y t h i s i n t e r f a c e , p u r s u e s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y
f r o m w i t h i n a d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l . I n t h i s w a y , t h e l i n k s
e x t e n d i n g o u t w a r d s ( t o r e a l i t y ) a n d i n w a r d s ( t o t h o u g h t s a n d b e l i e f s )
f r o m t h e i n t e r f a c e a r e h e l d t o b e s t r i c t l y c a u s a l ( n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l ) i n
n a t u r e . I t h a s b e e n t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t i t
i s t h e n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l n a t u r e o f t h e s e c a u s a l l i n k s a n d i n t e r f a c e s t h a t
u l t i m a t e l y i n v a l i d a t e s t h e c l a i m s o f b o t h t h e f o r m a l i s t a n d t h e e x t r a -
f o r m a l i s t . F o r i n o r d e r t o d e s c r i b e t h e m e a n i n g o f a p r e m i s e o r t h e w a y i n
w h i c h a p r e m i s e i s j u s t i j " z e d , w e m u s t f i r s t m a k e u s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l n o t i o n s ,
i n f a c t t h e i n t e n t i o n a l n o t i o n s o f m e a n i n g a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i n t h e v e r y
l a n g u a g e t h a t w e e m p l o y . T h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y " w h i c h e m e r g e d f r o m t h e
a n a l y s e s a b o v e i s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f a f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i s e t h i s f a c t . "
1 9 P u t n a m h a s r e c e n t l y e x a m i n e d p e r c e p t i o n a n d r e f e r e n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o m i n d / b o d y
d u a l i s m i n ' R e a l i s m w i t h o u t A b s o l u t e s ' a n d ' T h e Q u e s t i o n o f R e a l i s m ' i n W o r d s a n d L i f e .
2 0 I n f a i l i n g t o g r a s p t h e t r u e s o u r c e o f t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y t o e m e r g e f r o m t h e p e r m u t a t i o n
a r g u m e n t s o f P u t n a m a n d Q u i n e - t h e u s e o f n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e t o e x p l a i n
i n t e n t i o n a l n o t i o n s - t h e o r i s t s s u c h a s D e v i t t h a v e r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s i n d e t e r m i n a c y i n a w a y
w h i c h f u r t h e r p e r p e t u a t e s i t . D e v i t t ' s ' c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n ' r e s p o n s e t o P u t n a m s i m p l y
r e i n t r o d u c e s i n d e t e r m i n a c y , o n l y t h i s t i m e a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e s e c o n d - o r d e r s t a t e m e n t t h a t
t h e w o r d ' r e f e r e n c e ' i s c a u s a l l y c o n n e c t e d t o R
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In conclusion, I want to sketch briefly what I consider to be the way
forward in petitio principii analysis, a way forward which has itself been
instrumental in rejecting the form/content dichotomy. In examining
issues of form and content in the current discussion, the focus of analysis
was upon the type of justification and explanation advanced by the
formalist and extra-formalist respectively in defence of their claims.
Indeed, the very basis of the rejection of this dichotomy lay in our
understanding that a type of justificatory and explanatory failure had
occurred, for example, that the only way in which the formalist and the
extra-formalist could even begin to make their claims precise required
that they make use of the very notions to which they were fundamentally
opposed. Now, the true value of this type of dialectical'" inquiry consists
in the changes that it effects within our understanding of the nature of
certain problems, such as, in the present context, in the way in which we
view notions like evidence and justification. These different and, I would
argue, improved ways of thinking about such concepts could facilitate
discussion of related issues, for example, could facilitate discussion of the
issue of the conditions under which petitio principii, normally
naturalistic connections between the word 'reference' and R17 ; it is the idea that one of
these declares itself to have the honor of making RI7 be the relation of reference
independently from all operational and theoretical constraints that is entirely
unintelligible' (Putnam, 1983. p. 296).
21 'Given the lack of any rational connection between the surface irritations and what is
outside (or inside) the skin, it is not to be wondered at that language ends up without any
determinate reference to reality' (Putnam I994b, p. 282). ('Surface irritations' refers to
stimulations of nerve endings in Quine's model oflanguage.)
22 The dialectical nature of Putnam's investigations is dearly evident. James Conant, in the
introduction to Words and Life, describes this particular element in Putnam's thought:
'Some of them [Putnam's essays] begin with a dialectical overview of a philosophical
controversy (often in order to try to bring out how the crucial presuppositions are ones
which both parties to the dispute share). The proximate goal of these essays therefore is not
to attempt to have the last word about a philosophical problem, but rather to give the
reader a sense of the shape and the depth of the problem-of how, for example, in a
particular philosophical dispute, thesis and counter-thesis bear one another's stamp and
how each of the pair comes with its own false bottom, hiding the true dimensions of the
problem from view' (p . xiii). It has been a contention of this discussion that the
presuppositions shared by both the formalist and the extra-formalist have their bases in a
dualist conception of mind.
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